

25X1



12 March 1965

**PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF CIA ORGANIZATIONAL PROPOSAL**

**A. ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:**

An Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will be established to formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. Specifically the Executive Committee will:

1. Examine the reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB against technical and fiscal capabilities, so as to establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP. In this role it will rely largely on cost effectiveness and technical feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component elements of the NR Organization.
2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR program and its budget as forwarded by the DNR.
3. Acting through the DNR, allocate responsibility to CIA and/or DOD for research and preliminary design studies for new systems.
4. Allocate development responsibility for specific reconnaissance programs to DOD or CIA, and establish

NRO review(s) completed.



25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

guidelines for mutual support where appropriate. It shall be free to use technical advisory groups as necessary.

5. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD or CIA for various types of manned overflight missions, subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Committee. x

6. Review periodically the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

**B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:**

To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance activities and to provide a single point of integration for the planning and budgeting of the National Reconnaissance Program, a Director of National Reconnaissance will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, who will report to the Executive Committee on all matters affecting the NRP. Specifically, he will:

1. Be kept fully and completely informed of all reconnaissance activities in CIA and DOD.
2. Coordinate CIA and DOD use of the space launching, tracking and recovery facilities.

25X1

[REDACTED]

3. Coordinate film processing of CIA and DOD activities so as to make best use of the primary Eastman-Kodak facility at Rochester, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

4. Prepare a coordinated and consolidated NRP budget for examination and approval by ExCom. This budget will be based on submissions from appropriate elements of CIA and DOD.

5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD elements in lump sum transfers each fiscal year. Incremental funding from reserve or reprogramming sources will be used only for supplemental programs approved by ExCom.

6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his designated alternate on all matters of policy, coordination, or guidance. He will not exercise command control over operating elements of CIA or its personnel.

7. Assume such command responsibilities over DOD elements of the NRP as the Secretary of Defense may designate. He will establish suitable lines of coordination with those line components which do not respond directly to him.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1




8. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

9. Appear before the 303 Committee with appropriate operating elements of CIA or DOD to secure approval for overhead reconnaissance missions.

C. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:

1. Research on reconnaissance technology and preliminary design of new systems will be encouraged and supported in both CIA and DOD. It will be supported by a lump sum allocation from NRP funds to each group in like measure at a level to be established each year by the Executive Committee.

2. A prescribed fraction of these resources -- perhaps 20% to 40% -- will be earmarked for support of basic research on reconnaissance technology to stimulate and assure the future vigor of this field. The DNR will be kept fully informed of all activities and developments in this connection for the purpose of ensuring appropriate coordination and preventing unwitting duplication as well as encouraging joint exploitation of new techniques.



25X1

25X1




3. Preliminary design and small technical feasibility demonstrations of new reconnaissance systems will also be funded from this innovation resource. Such work can grow out of requirements originating with USIB, the ExCom or the DNR for improvements in existing capabilities, or can result from spontaneous initiative in the CIA and DOD participating elements. However, it is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be recognized, approved or discouraged, and synchronized for later decision actions.

4. It is intended that these funds and their products represent the flexible cutting edge of the reconnaissance program. They should not be used to fund actual development or operational activities.

D. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT:

1. When a new system concept has been sufficiently well defined and its technical feasibility established to the



25X1

25X1



satisfaction of the ExCom, it would be included in the inventory of the NRP. At this point, it should receive necessary funding from line items in the budget identified with these systems. These funds would then be allocated to CIA and/or DOD, to whom specific developmental responsibility has been assigned by the ExCom.

2. The element of CIA and/or DOD assigned development responsibility for a new system will be responsible for selecting and supervising capable contractors; for establishing such systems engineering support as they deem necessary; for rendering periodic reports on program progress to the DNR and ExCom and generally for the success of the program.

3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterized primarily by the payload [cameras, spacecraft, data recovery system] as well as by their boosters. The interface between the launch system and payload is of critical importance and planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities, boosters, tracking, and recovery must proceed with the payload development. The DNR will be responsible for the success of this interface.

ILLEGIB

25X1


25X1



4. A normal phase of satellite development programs is the initial flight testing in orbit and engineering proof of the completed payload system. These flight tests will be the primary responsibility of the payload developing group in CIA or DOD, which would be expected to include as many intelligence targets as are consistent with the primary development so that any film recovered would have intelligence value. When a system had been successfully demonstrated and declared operationally reliable, it would enter the operational phase.

E. ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PHASE:

1. When the satellite payload has been successfully developed, it becomes a part of the operational assets of the NRP. The payloads together with appropriate boosters, launchers and tracking stations represent the NRP capability to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represent part of an orderly program to acquire such intelligence in response to USIB requirements, target lists and priorities. The DNR must play the central role in planning this program.



25X1

25X1



It involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in addition to development flight tests. It requires a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations and the corresponding intelligence needs. It is a complex managerial task for which a single individual must in the last analysis be responsible.

2. Both the long range requirements for satellite missions and the shifting targets for specific flights come properly from the intelligence community in which all elements of the Government have a voice. The community has named COMOR as the staff to provide these requirements in an orderly way, subject to approval by USIB.

3. The Satellite Operations Center is the next step in that sequence of events. Its function is to plan specific mission coverage in light of COMOR target requirements. It does so by first studying the spectrum of orbital choices available. These are supplied by various groups on the West



25X1



25X1

[REDACTED]

Coast and represent specific launch vehicle propulsion capabilities, current range safety restrictions, etc. These feasible orbits are then computer analyzed in Washington to optimize target coverage in light of sun angle, predicted weather conditions and target priorities. An orbit is selected and camera programs established for this mission. This is basically an intelligence function.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1


25X1

25X1



[REDACTED] In the case of CORONA coverage, the SOC has played a central role in determining the ephemeris of the mission and transmitting computerized guidance to the launch authority. Until the spring of 1963, the Satellite Operations Center was located at CIA Headquarters next to COMOR where it was used exclusively in CORONA and ARGON flights and was in immediate communication with the West Coast facilities. It was then moved to the Pentagon with a view to extending its functions to include [REDACTED] LANYARD, although mission guidance to these programs is not yet determined

25X1

25X1




by the SOC largely because of their continued classification as R&D flights. The SOC should be used to provide the intelligence input for mission guidance of all satellite operations



25X1

25X1

5. Although most of the responsibility of the developing team is fulfilled when a satellite payload is declared operational, there are persuasive arguments for extending this responsibility indefinitely into the operational phase. The most compelling argument is that payloads systems are being continually improved -- and should be. The remarkable improvement of CORONA from monoscopic to stereo and then to doubled film capacity via double recovery vehicles is an example. Furthermore, these are extremely delicate instruments and no two payloads from a given system are quite alike. Continuity from launch is therefore essential. This does not mean that the camera contractor should fire a THOR or ATLAS. It does mean that there is no point in the production or operational sequence when one can safely eliminate the payload team



25X1


25X1



completely from the operation. The CORONA program recognized this and has representatives of CIA and its contractors present at each step of an operational mission - but with varying degrees of authority.

25X1

25X1




6. Once a satellite payload is launched in orbit, it enters a crucial period of real time tracking, monitoring and control. Tracking and telemetry recording from low altitude photography is accomplished by Air Force stations. This data is transmitted to Sunnyvale, California, where the operation is run. In the case of CORONA, inflight decisions include decisions to recover if a malfunction is suspected and transmissions of camera program changes received from the SOC to the satellite so as to take advantage of changing weather.


25X1



25X1



25X1




NIPE/JABross:mm/12 Mar 65

Distribution

Cys 1 & 2: DepSecDef  
3: DDCI  
4: DDS&T  
5: NIPE

REC'D 18X  
DDI 281  
JUN 10 1965  
- 12 -  
RECEIVED



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100030014-9  
25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100030014-9